Morsleben network set up

What does the Federal Office for Radiation Protection say?



Morsleben is unsafe, fundamentally unsuitable for depositing nuclear waste. The waste there now would continue radiating for millions of years, although the plan-approval procedure was assuming a million years maximum. These statements were made by the representative of the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS), Dr. Michael Mehnert, who was invited to the seminar to report the status of the decommissioning procedure.

Unfortunately Mehnert was poorly briefed by his authority – he was unable to answer many questions; a representative of the licensing authority (the environment ministry of Saxony-Anhalt), who attended to speak on this issue, helped him out with answers. The Federal Office for Radiation Protection plans to submit the complete plan documents to the licensing authority by July this year. The ministry has already criticised the BfS for filing the decommissioning application in 1997 and having made practically no progress since then. If the documentation had been filed early on, said the ministry, plans could already have been approved.

Unfortunately the BfS doesn’t know yet whether it will keep to its own planning schedule this time. There is discussion in the BfS whether the activity of the backfilling materials has to be taken into account in assessing long-term security. This also still needs to be coordinated with the Federal Environment Ministry (to which the BfS is responsible).

According to the BfS “schedule” the plan documents could be laid open to public inspection in April 2005 and the period for raising objections ended by July. The subsequent public hearing could conclude in January 2007.

Representatives of civic action groups demanded an interim status report, which the BfS should make available before the start of public availability of the plans. This was the way it was done with another former salt mine used as a nuclear dump, Schacht Konrad, because the period for which the documents are laid open to public inspection is too short for intensive scrutiny of and response to them.



The plan approval decision was to be expected in September 2008. Then the repository would be regeared for decommissioning operation until 2009; backfilling and sealing would take until 2024.

The BfS has been doing antedated backfilling since 2000 – backfilling parts of the Morsleben final repository for radioactive wastes (ERAM for short). Until March 2001 atomic waste repositories in the Südfeld (South Field) were covered with salt grit because roof falls were feared. These could have swirled up radioactive material and moved it through the ventilation system to the environment. Since October 2003 large amounts of salt concrete are being backfiilled in the central section – as a mining emergency precaution. This is to strengthen the stability of the mine as a whole. The responsible mining authority has so far ordered backfilling with 214,000 m³ of material by 2005. After that a second – not yet ordered or licensed – phase with another 416,000 m³ of salt concrete is scheduled by 2008.

According to Mehnert, the radioactive wastes are still retrievable. In the South Field the seam had not been closed off but only covered over; in the Central Field no nuclear waste was involved.

The BfS had examined six decommissioning concepts: retrieval, leaving in place and flooding, flooding with saline solution, backfilling and sealing in the near surrounding, pore-space store concept and backfilling and sealing in the farther surrounding. The BfS has decided on the last option. It did not emerge clearly from what Mehnert was saying just how the various concepts were examined.



Retrieval was out of the question because of formal legal reasons because a permanent operating licence existed. Flooding with saline solution was a GDR concept based on the idea that sated solutions would not further attack the salt rock. A flooding also appears unsuitable – it is precisely this that the anti-nuclear movement has for years named as a danger.

But the BfS concept leaves many questions unanswered: How is it to be prevented that radioactive solutions leave the mine layout before their radioactivity has declined? In an emergency, how can additional measures (for example sealings) be carried out? Why are “final repository criteria” developed at the federal level if these don’t come into use, as is now the case in Morsleben? It is clear that Morsleben can never meet final repository criteria. So is the waste going to be left lying down there just because it happens to be there?

Another problem for every closure concept are the questions that are not known: non-existent sketch plans of all parts of the mine; unclear water inflows that exist without anyone knowing how the water got into the salt dome; precise knowledge about the rock formations; etc. Many problems can’t be solved without further worsening the insecurity of Morsleben: To clarify water inflows redrilling could be done. But then it would no longer drip, but flow. To establish precisely the strength of the rock layers many more drillings could be made. Then the permeability of the layers would be even greater.

The concepts presented by the BfS so far are completely unsatisfactory. There is said to exist meanwhile an interim environmental impact assessment, but the licensing authority has not received it. It is time for more transparency to be created.

Safety problems



The total excavation volume of the Morsleben mine comprises about 5.8 million m³. Originally the emplacement of 150,000 m³ of radioactive waste was planned; just over 36,000 m³ were emplaced up to 1998. In addition to wastes from operating power stations the repository contains materials from research, state collecting depots and decommissionings.

Jürgen Kreusch of Gruppe Ökologie, responsible for several critical reports on the ERAM, explained in broad strokes the problems in this final repository. It is a large twin shaft facility with complex geometry. That makes prognoses and barrier concepts extremely difficult. The salt mining operations broke through and loosened the salt dome; hydraulic barriers are missing in places. It has long been known that this allows ingresses of water and brine. It is to be expected that the volume of ingressing fluids will increase; only the time, amount and location are unknown. Past potash mining poses the additional risk of ingressing water opening new excavations, openings, voids, thereby creating more problems. The unavoidable convergence and gas formation in the salt dome lead to an extrusion of contaminated brine. Only the speed of flow determines whether radioactive materials get into the biosphere before their activity has declined. From the geological point of view the anhydrite deposits also represent a problem because they might link with the overburden, also making contact with ground water more likely. Sealing in salt mining is almost impossible because after a time water always finds new ways.

The stability of Morsleben is already low. Solutions flow into the mine layout via water paths and ground water flows. This can cause dissolution of (potash) salts, thereby further corrupting the stability and barrier effects. This creates new paths and flows, which further reduce stability. This principle can continue spiralling and increase the dangers to the nuclear waste. Hence one basic problem is to prevent the situation worsening.

Jürgen Kreusch raised another question: is the salt concrete now being backfilled and also to be used in later backfilling safe over the long term? Could it not be possible that over time it loses its barrier effect by dissolution of the salt ingredient?

The present decommissioning concept of the BfS aims at preventing ingressing of brine, increasing the rock-mechanical stability and triggering processes that change the types of solutions. For this the emplacement areas are to be hydraulically separated from the rest of the mine with salt concrete. Subsequently a far-reaching backfilling is to be done.

If the waste should instead be retrieved from the repository, Kreusch sees the need to attend to the following problem areas: danger from waste in the biosphere, location of interim/permanent repository, transports, workers, radiation burdens on employees, handling the deposited fluid wastes and filter ashes, costs.

Morsleben activists have different views about the decommissioning concepts. But they were agreed that at least until a colloquium to be held in spring of 2005 the “movement” should not commit to decommissioning concepts and that the “retrieval” option must be kept open.

Experiences with other procedures

According to the current plan of the BfS – which can still change – the public scrutiny and objection period is to run from April to July 2005. Then people who feel concerned – including from other states – can file objections. These do not have to meet any set criteria; general objections must also be examined.

Despite this the planned involvement of the public can by no means be regarded as democratic participation. The licensing authority is under no obligation to share the objections, it just has to respond to them. But objections are prerequisite to possible subsequent litigation. That is, it can make sense to file an objection to be able to sue later. In public the number of objections plays a big part. It is of small weight in the licensing procedure, but thousands of objections can raise the political pressure. In specific technical respects, however, these procedures have rarely achieved anything.

Peter Dickel of the AG Schacht Konrad, who was invited to speak to this agenda item, emphasised that it could not be the task of the critical public to present solutions or alternative concepts. The applicants and the authorities have the money for that. The cause of the anti-nuclear movement should be to point to weaknesses and to raise questions the applicants had to answer. This created pressure on the authorities and the quality of their work had to be raised. It will be important in the Morsleben process to intensively discuss the decommissioning concepts. Public participation had to be organised campaign-like: timely networking of expert discussions, work out objections already in the run-up. In the Morsleben case nothing is gained by “playing for time” because with every year that passes, the risks grow. Moreover, early backfilling could create facts that made retrieval impossible. Hence the delaying tactics of the BfS had to be ended in connection with the demand to make all relevant documentation available to the public.

Mood in the region

The refusal of the mayors of Morsleben and Beendorf (a neighbour community) to take part in a podium discussion at this function actually shows plainly the mood of the responsible politicians directly around Morsleben: Shut eyes and through! No fuss, please, the BfS’ll fix it, don’t worry! Accordingly Mayor Kniep of Morsleben declared in the run-up to the event that he felt adequately informed, the local people were sensitised enough so that he saw no sense in coming. Moreover, he did not want to offer opponents a platform. Beendorf’s mayor Friedrichs, for his part, had said until four days before that he’d take part in the podium and that he agreed with the agenda. Two days later he spoke on to the answering device of the inviting foundation that he could live well with the local situation and saw no reason to attend.

The only one to attend was the mayor of Helmstedt, Eisermann. He has been in office only since autumn last year and only through the invitation learned that Morsleben is still a live issue. He spoke of the town’s efforts. For example, since 1980 there were recurrent sporadic activities by Helmstedt, such as petitions, questions, studies. A former woman resident of Helmstedt relativised this account and said Helmstedt had always passed on questions but never been really active itself. Eisermann promised to be more alert to the issue from now on. If needed, he could imagine his town supporting critical studies again.



Morsleben network founded

The need felt for networking gave rise to the idea to reintroduce the idea of the "Morsleben Workshop" that existed in earlier resistance times. About every three months a nationwide conference of activists from civic action groups, associations and politicians (?) is to be convened to coordinate activities and work on content. Every workshop is to have one or two main themes for which individuals prepare.

The next Morsleben Workshop will be on 19 June from 2 p.m. on the BUND premises in Magdeburg. Participants who have already accepted the invitation include ecology students (BSÖ), AG Schacht Konrad, Greenkids Magdeburg, BUNDjugend, BI Morsleben, Robin Wood and NAJU.

One main theme will be possible objections to the decommissioning procedure. For this, earlier objections are being looked at and will be presented to the workshop in conjunction with further suggestions. Robin Wood will present a report on the current situation and on how the thinking of the BfS and the federal ministry about including the radioactivity inventories of the backfill material in the long-term safety investigations developed.

The network will initially use the name "Morsleben-Netzwerk". Other groups that want to participate actively are being sought. As part of the further public relations work talks are also planned with local governments, churches, trade unions and political party officials. In addition to projects already being planned, such as developing a mobile exhibition, brochures and an Internet website, there are to be stalls at local festivities to reach the population. Many other information opportunities are likely to present themselves.

In the spring of 2005 there is to be a colloquium at which the major decommissioning concepts are to be presented and can be discussed by the critical public and scientists. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation and church organisations will be asked to host the event.

To be able later to commission expert studies and finance public relations work collection of donations has to start soon. An account for the purpose will be set up at the BI Morsleben / Helmstedt.

The Morsleben-Netzwerk wants the safest possible decommissioning concept for the repository. Pressure is to be exerted on the BfS so that no more delays occur and the planning documentation is made public as soon as possible. Then the public must be given enough time and opportunity to conduct critical debate about these plans. For this, critical experts and specialist support have to be organised/financed. The BfS should present an optimal decommissioning concept without rotten compromises. In the run-up it should issue comprehensible interim reports so that debate is enabled even before the laying open for public scrutiny.

Most important in the time up to the objection period will be sensitising the public. That is because so far people are sweeping the issue under the mental carpet; yet Morsleben could attain model character for other decommissioning procedures: if safety standards are lowered here, that could have consequences for other locations.

Even before the planning documentation is presented for public scrutiny, it has to be considered which objections are possible and which should be especially emphasised. Critical experts have to be identified and funding assured. Also conceivable are many actions with high publicity value.

The major information medium for the time being will remain the Morsleben-Newsletter, circulated irregularly by email. It can be subscribed on the provisional Morsleben Internet site,  http://morsleben.antiatom.de. Articles and the newsletters published so far are collated there in the Forum.







email:  morsleben@greenkids.de ¦ Homepage:  http://morsleben.antiatom.de/ ¦ Address: Karl-Schmidt-Str. 4, 39104 Magdeburg ¦ Telephone: #49-0162-8608949

· See also

· New resistance at Morsleben nuclear dump



Translated by Diet Simon