German involvement in Burma

This was Burma's first joint venture with a foreign countrysince its self-imposed isolation from the West after the coup of1962. Although Weizsacker did not reveal the name of the Germanfirm, it was,in fact, Fritz Werner Industry Ausrustungen-GmbH, FRG(FWAR), a company of notorious reputation among the Burmesepeople.1 The German president later visited projects beingimplemented under the auspices of this ground-breaking economiccooperation agreement between the two countries. One of thestops on his excellency's itinerary was the beach at Ngapali, apopular tourist resort on the Araken coast. The German presidentattracted much attention from the Burmese people while there, as aresult of a highly symbolic "PR" event, in which he was seen ridingan elephant. In the cultural and historic tradition of Burma theancient monarchs rode elephants as a symbol of their power anddivine royal authority. Through the eyes of the Burmese people,therefore, this unusual display by the German excellency signifiedculturally that the Burmese military war lords were honoring thisforeign "king" in hopes of receiving continuing and increased aidand investment from Germany.

This seemingly isolated incident of the German president'svisit to Burma in 1986 is, in fact, an important, if largelysymbolic, manifestation of the close German economic ties that theBurmese oligarchy has profited from historically, and continues tocash in on up to the present date.

However, before delving further into these economicconnections, let us take a look at the recent intense politicalturbulence within Burma, which serves as the context from which allcontemporary Burmese issues must be examined.

BACKGROUND: THE UPRISING OF 1988
In 1988 a student-led nationwide uprising emerged in Burma, leading to the fall of the Burma Socialist Program Party(BSPP), the same ruling party which was praised by the Germanpresident Weizsacker just two years previous during his "historic State visit". A reactionary, military "coup" in September 1988,declaring a new era of restored "law and order", followed on theheels of this spontaneous, grass-roots movement for democracy. Itis estimated that at least 8,000 people were brutally massacred bythis "State Law and Order Restoration Committee"(SLORC), the "new"manifestation of the same governing military thugs who had runBurma since 1962. Among the many victims of this crackdown weregrade school, high school, and university students, workers, farmers, Buddhist monks, and people from all groups within theethnically diverse Burmese national landscape.

To escape execution or imprisonment, thousands ofstudents, teachers, peasants and workers fled to the jungle areasalong Burma's borders where they could take refuge among someof the semi-autonomous ethnic minorities within Burma, many ofwhom are fighting the central government in Rangoon. It is nowestimated that at least 338,000 refugees live along theSino-Burma, Thai-Burma and Indo-Burma borders.

THE CAUSES
The pivotal factors leading up to the uprising were numerous. On an economic level, people were angry and hurt that their proudand resource-rich country, once the wealthiest nation in theregion, was now ranked as one of the ten poorest countries in theworld by the UN. Perseverance, struggle, and hard work on theirpart did not seem to have resulted in any upgrading of the nation'sdevelopment, nor any improvement in their own personal financialstatus.

People were also angered by the military junta's suddendemonetization of some of the major Burmese currency notes (whichare produced by the "Warzi Currency Printing Industry", which,incidentally, was built through German technological and financialassistance). Outrageously, no compensation was given to Burmese whoheld these currencies in their hands, effectively wiping out manypeople's essential savings. This tactic was designed to cripplethose hoarding cash for the purpose of dealing in illegal bordertrade and smuggling. In reality, it most devastated those who couldleast afford it - the poor - whose already minimal earnings, whichhad at least sustained their hand-to-mouth existence, were nowsuddenly useless paper.

The iron-fisted, one-party rule of the long-time dictator NeWin, and the lack of truly free elections, decent education, ordemocratic participation in the running of the country, also addedto the people's growing mood of discontent. On a very personallevel, almost everyone had relatives or close friends in prison,and fear of arrest was the daily diet of the people, as unjustpolitical imprisonment, harassment, torture, and killings hadbecome commonplace.

Some of Burma's ethnic minority groups(the Karen, Chin, Shanetc.) had been fighting for their survival against the centralBurman government since as far back as the late 1940's, and studentprotest of the Ne Win regime had emerged even in his first year inpower, 1962, resurfacing periodically since that time. So, as youcan see, there had been a long history of struggle against thegovernment from various sectors of Burmese society leading up tothis massive uprising in 1988.

At this point, let us turn our attention back to the morespecific question of how German economic involvement in Burmarelates to the desperate situation of oppression, suffering, andinjustice in Burma outlined above.

THE GERMAN-BURMESE ARMS CONNECTION
It doesn't require too much analysis to begin to make theconnections between German economic involvement in Burma, and thedaily injustices suffered by the Burmese common people. Forexample, many of the estimated 8,000 peaceful demonstrators whowere viciously mowed down during the bloody showdown between themilitary junta and the student-led movement in 1988, were killed bythe 22nd Light Infantry Army unit who, coincidentally, were armedwith G-3 and G-4 assault rifles produced and provided by FritzWerner Arms Industry, which, at that time, was owned by the GermanGovernment.

The dubious role played by the German government in arms production and supply of the Burmese military junta before andsince the now notorious 1988 massacre, is certainly an importantissue to focus on for those working for democracy and human rightsin Burma, as well as the international community in general

An exploratory German parliamentary inquiry in 1989 concerning the link between the German government and the Fritz Wernercompany yielded an evasive and rather impolite answer. (MinorParliamentary Inquiry, 15.2.89).

In March of 1990 Germany's major opposition party, the Social Democrats(SPD), filed another inquiry, this time extendingtheir questions beyond the specific issue of Fritz Werner'sinvolvement in Burma, to the broader question of the Germangovernment's relationship to the Burmese military junta ingeneral.- (Minor Parliamentary Inquiry, 7.3.1990). Up to thispoint, however, the German government has yet to supply anyconcrete reply to the Bundestag with reference to this inquiry intotheir dealings with the Burmese junta, particularly in regard toweapons trading.

Although the German government halted its official aiddisbursements to Burma in 1988 - in the turbulent wake of thepolitical crisis there and the accompanying international outcryagainst the Burmese government - German companies, in particularFritz Werner, continue to privately work with the Burmese militaryjunta, and new Burmese-German joint ventures have been signed.(seeAppendix on Burma-Fritz Werner joint venture of 1990)

As a result of this on-going German involvement it now becomesnecessary for people concerned about Burma's future to seriouslyevaluate if these joint ventures truly benefit the people ofBurma, or only contribute to continuing oppression and injustice. In order to do this, it may be helpful to make a closer examinationof the oft-mentioned Fritz Werner Industry, and the nature of itslong history of involvement in Burma.

FRITZ WERNER'S HISTORY IN BURMA
A diplomat familiar with Burmese politics has noted that,"Fritz Werner has a unique relationship with the Burmese rulingelite that has been cultivated over the years. There is a greatdeal of mutual trust between the company and the Burmesegovernment, whose military-minded leaders look for suchcharacteristics as reliability and discretion from a businesspartner."2

The Fritz Werner company struck up this now historicpartnership with the Burmese government, referred to in the quoteabove, in 1953, shortly after Burma obtained independence fromGreat Britain in January 1948. This was a time of considerablepolitical disorder in Burma. Ethnic separatist movements seeking ajust autonomy were already emerging within the fragile,newly-formed Union of Burma, creating an immediate demand forweapons within the central Burman government. Fritz WernerCompany, which was wholly owned by the West Germangovernment(falling under the jurisdiction of the West GermanMinistry of Economy), quickly stepped forward to meet that demand. Presently, Fritz Werner is the fifth largest exporter of arms inthe world.3

Since this original contact in 1953, the Commander-in-chief ofthe Burmese Armed forces and long-time dictator, Ne Win, hascultivated friendly relations with the Fritz Werner family, bothdiplomatically and personally. Fritz Werner technical advisorsposted in Rangoon have had continuous access to the dictator, evenfollowing his "retirement" in 1988, a rare privilege not extendedto the representatives of other foreign firms. Ne Win has evenbeen so generous as to build a grand, Burmese-style house for theFritz Werner family in Geisenheim, Germany. The fact that FritzWerner was owned by the West German government itself hascreated a close personal relationship between the two governments,making Burma "the friendliest nation toward West Germany in Asia".4

Fritz Werner's secretive Burmese operations, which haveoften been shrouded under a veil of mystery, got into full swing in1957. In this year they established their first weapons factory,on the outskirts of Rangoon, and launched into full-scaleproduction of G.2 (Gun 2), G.3 (Gun 3), and G.4 (Gun 4) rifles,7.62 mm. and 9 mm. small arms ammunition, and a range ofexplosives including Claymore mines and mortar shells up to 81 mmin size. (Dawn, Vol.1 No.23 Dec 1989, p 10) This start-up wasachieved with the assistance of the West Germany Arms company Heckler and Koch. The factory was supervised by Germanengineers from the German Technical Corporation Agency (GTZ).

The Burmese military has often used these German-producedweapons to oppress the Burmese people and various ethnic minoritygroups, especially following the military's seizure of power underGen. Ne Win in 1962. For example, on the 7th of July, 1962, justthree days after Ne Win's ruling Burmese Socialist Program Party(BSPP) was formed, the students of Rangoon University, underthe leadership of the influential Rangoon University StudentsUnion (RUSU), organized a peaceful demonstration inside theRangoon University Campus. Ne Win and his close militaryassociates sent troops equipped with G-3 automatic rifles intothe university campus with orders to fire into the crowds ofthousands of students, who were peacefully demonstrating. Over 100students were killed and many more injured. The next morning NeWin ordered the destruction of the RUSU building, which was atreasured historical monument of the Burmese independencemovement against the British. The building was blasted topieces by heavy explosives, and every trace of it removed.Morerecently, during the 1988 student uprising, over eight thousandpeople were killed by more of these same German-produced weapons.

Not only did the Fritz Werner Co. produce the vast majority of armaments required by the Burmese military, they also served asa conduit for all importation of raw materials, machine parts and chemicals used in explosives production. Most of this destructiveinflow of weapons material came from the countries of Belgium,Sweden, and Singapore, as well as smaller amounts originating in England, Pakistan and Israel.5 In order to sustain their exportsales in a declining world arms market, all of these nations seem willing to turn a blind eye to the horrible consequences of theirtrade in death.

THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO 1988
The cozy relationship between the West Germans and the Burmesemilitary was something of a closely kept secret until 1988, whenthe democracy uprising and surrounding political crisis blew thelid off the Burmese situation, and drew the attention of the wholeworld. Due to the international pressure brought upon the WestGerman government by the horror of the September 1988 coup, itsuddenly became one of the outspoken critics of the Burmeseregime, as if they hadn't known before how many Burmese had died inthe past at the hands of the government - hands that were holdingWest German weapons. The German government suspended developmentco-operation activities with Burma, including negotiationsregarding Burmese debt cancellation(W.G. Cabinet June 1988).

The West German government also claimed that all exportauthorization of arms to Burma had ceased. Despite assertions madeby the West Germans that the Fritz Werner Co. was no longer participating in the production of weapons and explosives (124th Parliament Session, 15th of Feb. 1989), and that technicalco-operation had been reduced to a minimum, the fact remainsthat, to date, the manufacture of explosives and weapons continues, and three German employees of the GTZ remain in thecountry, disguising their true field of expertise.6

Despite the hasty withdrawal of German economic support fromBurma after the 1988 crackdown, it didn't take long before theFritz Werner company found an opportunity for renewed investment,in partnership with their old friend Ne Win, and his SLORCassociates. But, before continuing the Fritz Werner-Burmese saga,let us first set the economic context of Burma in the 1980's, as abackdrop into which these renewed German business ties occurred.

NEW FRITZ WERNER/SLORC JOINT VENTURES
In the 1950's, Burma ranked second in Asia economically,trailing only the resurgent Japanese in wealth and prosperity. Sadly, by the 1980's, Gen. Ne Win's economic policy, heralded asthe "Burmese Way to Socialism", but more widely perceived asstraight-forward military mismanagement and ineptitude, had miredthe country in a desperate state of poverty and depression. Thisdegraded condition reached a symbolic low point with Burma'saddition to the tattered ranks of the UN's "Least DevelopedCountry"(LDC) status.

In an attempt to remedy this disastrous state of affairs, theBurmese government(now called SLORC) once again turned to their oldfriends, the Fritz Werner company, to form up a joint venture withthe Burmese Ministry of Industry in 1990.(see Appendix-FritzWerner/Burma joint venture) The venture focused on implementingimport-substitution schemes involving the glass and tiremanufacturing industries, and developing technology for productionof basic tools like bench drills and lathes.

The limited success of this joint venture was made possiblethanks, in large part, to an old loan of US$500 million that theWest German government had been disbursing to Burma since the1960's.7 This infusion of cash included a US$65 million supplementthat West Germany had given Burma as recently as 1987, which wasdivided between US$15 million in technical grant, and US$50 million for "capital goods imports".8 Even with this money, many of the joint venture projects were closed down for want of spareparts and raw materials, which leads one to question whether theforeign exchange actually ended up in the projects they weredesignated for(or was it perhaps transferred to the military fordefense purposes?).

THE NE WIN FAMILY AND FRITZ WERNER
As one diplomat commented about the whole affair,"the FritzWerner company stands by itself a name="9"/>9 This quote highlightsthe close personal nature of the Fritz Werner-Ne Win business team.

For a time, Phyo Wai Win and his wife and son lived togetherat Ne Win's house in Munich, Germany. At present, however, Phyo isworking with Schlumberger Oil Company(which also invests inBurma) in the Hague, Netherlands, and is living together with his German girlfriend "Barbara".

The former Minister of Industry, U Maung Cho, is also knownto have long-standing personal ties with the Fritz Werner Company.Maung Cho was educated as an armaments engineer, first in England,where he spent four years, and later in the Federal Republic of Germany, where he spent another three years, and ended upmarrying a German wife,Ingeborg. While in Germany Maung Choreceived on-the-job training from Fritz Werner.10 With Ingeborg hehas a daughter "Petra".

"It was lucky for the Germans he didn't marry an English girl", quipped one seasoned Burma watcher. "Diplomatic relationsbetween the two countries have just emerged out of this thing", said this diplomat, in reference to Maung Cho's personalconnections in Germany. (Germany-Burma, dpa 21 Feb. 1984)

These kinds of personal relationships with Fritz Werner havehelped preserve Gen. Ne Win's Socialist government in power,despite the various insurgencies and unrest broiling over in hiscountry. The connections have also helped to line the pockets ofa small group of German businessman. Among the individual Germansmost benefiting from this cozy relationship are Joachim Frist ofFritz Werner Company, Fritz Schlemmer, a pharmaceutical salesman, and Siegfried Otto, the chairman of the Giesecke and Devrient group of companies.11

With Fritz Werner Industry serving as an outstanding specificexample of German business involvement in Burma, let us nextbroaden our scope to include an examination of Burmese\German tradedynamics in general, and its interconnectedness to issues of peaceand justice for ordinary Burmese people.

GERMAN-BURMESE TRADE RELATIONS AN OVERVIEW
Historically, Germany views Burma as a country with greateconomic potential. Its excellent population to land area ratio,and its status prior to World War Two, as the world's largestexporter of rice and a major exporter of petroleum, earned Burmathe distinction of being one of the wealthiest countries in SouthEast Asia. Along with its huge agricultural potential and promising oil and natural gas reserves, Burma has significant deposits of minerals in the areas of gemstones, jade, tin,silver, gold and tungsten. Furthermore, Burma is blesses with the world's largest (though rapidly diminishing) teak forest and arich supply of other tropical woods. Offshore, Burma has accessto teeming fisheries. Labor is extremely cheap, which isattractive for foreign investors as well. Burma's strategic location at the crossroads of South East Asia makes it apotentially ideal location for the export of cheap manufactured goods throughout the region.

For Burma, the Federal Republic of Germany is an important trading partner. As a supplier-country, it accounted for 23 percent of total Burmese imports in 1983, which was second only to Japan; as a purchaser of Burmese goods, Germany took ninthplace in world ratings, accounting for 2.1 percent of overallBurmese exports.12

Increasing German-Burmese trade is expected in the future.Support by private German firms for Burma's economic expansioncan be seen in the launching of a joint enterprise in the machinebuilding sector in the autumn of 1984 with the Fritz WernerCompany(as well as subsequent joint ventures as recently as 1990). This undertaking by Fritz Werner was generally seen as"trailblazing" for future economic relations between Burma and theFederal Republic of Germany.

Another signal of the push for smoother trade between Germany and Burma can be seen in the holding of a seminar designed topromote Burmese exports to the Federal Republic of Germany. This was organized jointly by the German Embassy in Rangoon and the Federal Office of Foreign Trade in Cologne. 13

GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF BURMESE RESOURCES
Germany has a great interest in exploiting the economicpotential of Burma's wealth of natural resources. For example, ithas been involved in the exploration of nickel and copper depositsin the Chin and Arakan mountains on the western fringes of Burma.This project was carried out by experts and advisers from theFederal Geo-Scientific and Raw Materials Establishment inHannover, Germany. This German scientific establishment was alsoinvolved in the evaluation of mineral prospecting work, andexploration for possible oil and natural gas deposits in differentregions of Burma.14

Germany hopes its close working relationship with Burma willlead to further lucrative development of both copper and nickeldeposits, as well as new expansion into natural gas andpetrochemicals. For example, Germany has reserved money for the Martaban Offshore Natural Gas Project which is designed toextract natural gas from the Gulf of Martaban, and process it into Methanol, and then, ultimately, into gasoline. Germany hopes thata successful exploration in the Gulf of Martaban will lead to theconstruction of new Burmese fertilizer factories operating onnatural gas. The Federal Geo-Scientific and Raw MaterialsEstablishment in Hannover has the full support of the Germangovernment in this endeavor. The German government has alreadysupplied geophysical(seismological) equipment for the oilexploration. The final details and contract arrangements betweenthe two countries have not yet been disclosed.15

The flip side of West German economic investment in Burmacan be seen in its importation of Burmese natural resources intoGermany. The Burmese government is rapidly selling off wholesaleits marketable natural resources in a desperate bid to bring inmuch needed foreign exchange. For example, in the past eightyears, Burma's German-built "Five Star" ships (S.S.Sagaing, Magwe, Pegu, Mandalay etc.) have exported a number of elephants,thousands of tons of teak wood, animal food, and minerals toGermany. (Burmese sources in Hamburg claim that arms from WestGermany have also been loaded on these Burmese Five Star Shippingline ships.)16

GERMAN TRAINING PROGRAMS
In order to sustain long-term trade operations andexploitation in Burma, the West German firms have sponsoredtraining programs for the Burmese. A list of the traininginitiatives Germany has sponsored in Burma include:

• - sponsorship of young military officials to study military,intelligence, and armaments training techniques in Germany
• - sponsorship of the Sinde Vocational Training Center and aRailway Workshop in Mandalay
• - supply of equipment and teaching aids to improve work andtraining at the Bawdwin Namtu mining and foundry plants
• - German assistance in the development of an integrated cropprotection service
• - sending of advisers for the Paleik textile factory, also builtwith German assistance
• - setting up of a short-term pool of experts for preparation andexecution of technical cooperation projects
• - Assistance in the drawing-up of a study for the electricitysupply in Rangoon
• - sponsorship of the cooperative system (sending of advisers,supply of equipment, training of specialists)
• - sponsorship of the Syriam Trade Training Center, which trainsspecialists in maintenance engineering and electrical maintenancework for technical installations in the industrial sector(especially in conjunction with the Industry and DefenseMinistries).
• - German assistance in the further development of Burmese radio(supply and installation of radio transmitters, financing of thetraining of experts, etc.)

The final entry listed above, the Burmese radio developmentproject, presents a clear, specific example of how German economicinvestment and training in Burma is used to support the military regime, and works against the people's struggle for democracy. Germany has been involved with the supply and installation ofradio transmitters to the Burma Broadcasting Station (which isheavily controlled by the military), and also in the training ofBurmese journalists, and radio and television technicians. Afterthe German training these journalists and technicians have nooption but to work for the only radio and television stations inRangoon, which are essentially the mouth pieces of the militarygovernment. Although these people are trained in Germany under theguidelines of a free press, they never write or announce the realsituation as it happens in Burma when they return. All news issimply headlines and propaganda produced by the military. So mostof the students trained in Germany end up coming back and servingthe dictator. As most of them are children or relatives of themilitary elite, they will work only to please their elders. This is one of the many methods used by the military to maintainits power and oppress its own people.18

GERMAN TRADE, BURMESE OPPRESSION: THE CONNECTION
All of these facts and figures point to a trade relationshipbetween Burma and Germany of significant proportions. But how dotrade connections tie into the broader issue of oppression andhuman rights violations in Burma?

The essential link between trade and oppression can be foundin the Burmese defense budget. In 1987 the Burmese governmentstated that the defense budget took 50% of all foreign exchange. Other observers of the government believe that thepercentage is much higher than this figure. Most of Burma's foreignexchange is obtained through trade. Since 1987 the defence budgethas risen from 1.7 billion kyats to 2 billion kyats, while thedomestic economic situation has worsened even further.

Starvation is now rife throughout the poor urban areas of themajor cities. One can quickly see how providing the Burmesegovernment with foreign exchange through trade ends up translatinginto more defense spending, more military oppression, and moreeconomic mismanagement inside Burma, all primary causes ofsuffering among the common people.

Next, we will take a short look at the similar role thatGerman developmental aid has played in Burma.

GERMAN DEVELOPMENTAL AID IN BURMA
The official state visit to Burma made by the German presidentin 1986, which was highlighted in the introduction, also pointed tothe potential future role that Burma may play as one of the focalpoints of German developmental aid.

BILATERAL AID
Germany has certainly been a major player in Burma'sdevelopmental projects historically. For example, during the1970-1988 pre-crackdown period, the Federal Republic of Germany was Burma's second largest donor of bilateral O.D.A (OfficialDevelopment Aid - see table 1 & 2). West German disbursements grewimpressively after 1978, reaching a record level of 1 billion DMduring this period.

In 1984-1985 alone, West Germany provided Burma with DM 150 million worth of financial aid. It was agreed to utilize thesefunds for the rehabilitation of the Thayetmyo Cement Factory, thepurchase of shunting locomotives, spare parts and equipment for Burmese railways, and for partial financing of the Kinda Hydro-Electric Power Station. Commodity aid amounting to DM 10million was also designated to be used for the purchase of urgentlyrequired imports such as industrial inputs and spare parts.

Financial aid cooperation between the Federal Republic ofGermany and Burma is built upon the historic priorities of Burma's own development policy. Earlier German aid assisted in the settingup of industrial manufacturing plants such as the Syriam glassbottle factory near Rangoon, the Bassein flat glass factory, the Sinde pump and engine factory, the brick works in Hmawbi andDanyigone, and the Paleik textiles factory. This cooperation inthe industrial sector has formed the basis for a close partnershipbetween Rangoon and Bonn, and encouraged a spirit of mutual trust.

Beyond the establishment and further development of industrialproduction plants, this financial aid cooperation is focusedprimarily on projects for the exploitation of Burmese rawmaterials, resources, and reserves, the boosting of agricultural productivity, measures designed to expand the transportation infrastructure, and vocational/educational training. A large proportion of financial cooperation funds is also set aside for commodity aid, chiefly involving the purchase of rawmaterials, food, spare parts and other badly-needed civilrequirements. - ( All data based on statistics provided by the FederalStatistical Office in Wiesbaden, Germany)

MULTILATERAL AID
In addition to this bilateral cooperation, the Federal Republic of Germany has made available to Burma annually anapprox. total of DM 50 million through multilateral channels.Beyond the direct loans of bilateral aid, Burma receives Germanmoney indirectly, via international bodies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U.N. Development Program(UNDP), or the International Development Association. Germany is a major contributor of funds to all of these institutions. There is also German involvement in the "Burma Consortium", setup by the World Bank to coordinate international aid to Burma.

This economic aid pipeline from Germany, both bilateral andmultilateral, sustains the Burmese military regime in much the sameway an active trading partnership does. It brings in much neededforeign exchange, supplies investment for governmentally-plannedprojects which fit into the state's security needs and strategies,provides legitimacy and good publicity, both internationally andinternally, to the unconstitutional Burmese police state, frees upother funds for military spending (the government's #1 priority),and usually benefits only the wealthy military elite who rake inany profits made off of economic development investment in Burma.

BURMESE-GERMAN POLITICAL TIES: A HISTORY
Finally, we will explore the nature of Burmese-Germanpolitical ties over the years and contemporarily. Presently,diplomatic relations between Burma and Germany appear stable andfree of major problems. In recent decades a dialogue based onmutual trust has evolved between the two nations. Despite thedifficulties presented by substantial differences in political/social systems, and the intervening factor of geographicaldistance, the countries share some similar affinities. Among theseis something of a common vision for profitable relations betweenFirst and Third World nations, with the German government in Bonndedicated to playing a facilitating role in the development ofeconomic and political stability within LDC's like Burma.

One expression of the historic good state of relations betweenGermany and Burma can be seen in the exchange of visits by prominent public figures on each side.

Most prominently from the Burmese side was Gen. Ne Win's visitto the Federal Republic of Germany in 1968, and subsequent trips inthe years 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1988, in his role as Chairman of thePolitburo of the Burma Socialist Program Party. The first fourvisits centered on Ne Win's desire for German weapons, while hisfinal trip in 1988 was focused on exploring the possibility, viathe conduit of his German lawyer, of political asylum in Germanyor Europe, should the democracy forces overthrow his regime.

Furthermore, the former Burmese prime minister, U Maung MaungKha, went to Germany privately in 1984, and had visited previouslyin 1976 while holding the position of Burma's Mining Minister.

There have also been several visits to the FederalRepublic of Germany by other Burmese parliamentarians and ministers including the former Foreign Minister Chit Hlaing(privately in 1984), Finance and Planning Minister (and deputyPremier) Thura Tun Tin (1984, also in 1978, 1982 and 1983),together with Defence Minister Thura Kyaw Htin (1982 and 1984),and the Industry Minister Col. Maung Cho (who was trained bythe Fritz Werner company while living in Germany).

The most prominent visitors to Burma from the Federal Republicof Germany have included the late Chancellor Ludwig Erhard (1958 in his capacity as Economic Minister), former Chancellor KurtEorg Kiesinger (1967), Former Minister of State Hildegard HammBrucher (1979), Overseas Aid Minister Jurgen Warnke (1984), StateSecretary Dieter von Wurzen (1984), and various delegations fromthe Federal Parliament.

In summary, the German-Burmese political relations which were initiated by the Fritz Werner family in 1950, and given impetusby the late Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's visit to Rangoon in 1958 inhis capacity as Economics Minister, reached its climax inFebruary 1986 when his excellency, the president of the FederalRepublic of Germany, Dr. Richard von Weizsacker, made the"historic visit" to Burma mentioned several times previously.

CONCLUSION
A CALL FOR GERMAN DISENGAGEMENT

Following the uprising in 1988, the European Community and the United States began imposing economic sanctions on Burma, identifying the high incidence of human rights abuses bythe government as the primary reason. At the same time thisanti-SLORC movement was happening in the West, German businessfirms were accelerating their assistance to the Burmese military.

Despite the dire human rights situation in Burma, Fritz Werner and other German firms are not slowing down theirinvestments, as their economic assistance continues to filter intoBurma. Many of these German firms are involved in highlysensitive and complex fields in Burma, such as weapons productionfor the military. All assistance relating to these sensitiveareas should be ceased temporarily until Burma can reach asettlement to its long civil war, and become more stable anddemocratic as a nation.

Investments by Fritz Werner and other companies bring benefitsnot to the Burmese people, but only to these companies, and to themilitary leaders who use them to buy more weapons to intensifytheir civil war against the people of Burma.

Fritz Werner and many foreign companies now investing in Burma, seem to fear that democracy will be restored in Burma and their investments will all be in vain. It seems that they areworried that when peace comes to Burma at last, and the 43 years of civil war ends, they won't be able to make a profit as easily asthey are now. Perhaps this is why Fritz Werner and other foreignfirms continue to prop up the Burmese military economically, andcontinue to supply them with weapons which are used to killinnocent people, even after most of the world community has cut offaid to Burma for humanitarian reasons.

The suffering of the Burmese people at the hands of thesemilitary rulers has become undeniable. The irresponsibleinvestments of Fritz Werner and others are indirectly encouragingthe torture, persecution, and killing of many ethnic nationals,clergymen, students, and organizations which are struggling fordemocracy inside Burma. For the Burmese people, the cooperation ofFritz Werner and other German firms has been extremelydiscouraging. It is time for these corporations to stop consideringonly how they can best exploit the untapped natural resources of Burma, and start listening to the cry of the Burmese people for democracy.

FOOTNOTES

1 Kaing Htan, "Burma and Fritz Werner" (in Burmese), March 1986.

2 "Germany - Burma" dpa Feb. 21, 1984.

3 "Stoppt den Rustungs Export der BOKO Co-ordanitationstelle,Bremen".

4 Interview with the former staff of Fritz Werner in Geisenheim,June 2, 1992.

5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Militarybalance 1992-1993 (London, II SS, 1992): 173 & Far Eastern EconomicReview, Dec 6, 1990: 27.

6 Judith Richter "Deutsche Geschäfte in Birma" April 24, 1991.

7 Embassy of FRG, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985.

8 Embassy of FRG, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985.

9 "Germany-Burma" dpa Feb. 21, 1984.

10 "Germany-Burma" dpa Feb. 21, 1984 & interview with the formerstaff of the Burmese Embassy in Bonn, June 21, 1992.

11 Dawn News Bulletin, Bangkok "Military Aid to Saw Maung" Vol. 1No. 23, Dec. 10, 1989.

12 Embassy of FRG, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985.

13 Embassy of FRG, "Press Release", 1985.

14 Embassy of FRG, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985.

15 Embassy of FRG, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985 & Bestelle FurAusfenhandles Information (BFAI) Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Myanmar(Burma) Wirtschaftsdaten May 31, 1990.

16 Interview with Kipp, European-Burmese Association, Hamburg, June30, 1992.

1717 FRG Embassy, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985.

18 Embassy of FRG, Rangoon "Press Release" 1985 & Fritz Werner"Referenzliste Industrieanlagenbau Stand 7/91.

APPENDIX I
Summary of Correspondence Concerning the Establishment of aMunitions Factory by Fritz Werner in Burma.*

Letter from the German Embassy in Rangoon to the Foreign Ministry,Bonn, of 5 July, 1958

The Burmese Secretary of State, U Tun Thaung, informed the Embassythat the Burmese government had decided to build a munitionsfactory for an amount of 20 million kyat and to hire the Berlincompany, Fritz Werner, under the condition that, apart from a firstinstallment of 5 million kyat, the remaining installments can bepaid back within 4 to 5 years. That means the contract shouldinclude the Hermes insurance (a German government body which givesloans and guarantees to ease foreign investors' risks.) TheBurmese Ministry of Defense urged that the factory should becompleted in 2 years. There were other offers from Japan and theCSSR, but the military institutions had special confidence in FritzWerner. Hermes should give its approval because Fritz Werner wouldnot have enough capital to run the project on its own. It wouldalso be important to strengthen the German position in thisimportant sector of the Burmese defense and to prevent that a(communist) East European country gets the contract.

Response from the Foreign Ministry, August 1958

The Hermes Committee rejected Fritz Werner's application regardingthe delivery of a munitions factory, in spite of the ForeignMinistry's approval. The reason for this rejection were theconditions of payment which - according to the application - shouldbe handled in installments within 7 years, beginning one year afterthe delivery - and not within 4 to 5 years, as stated before. Terms of payments beyond 5 years would only be granted to projectsin developing countries which serve to build up a healthy economy. However, the decision could be modified if acceptable paymentconditions were negotiated.

Handwritten note, 7/8/1958

Mr. Maier, a board member of Fritz Werner,s left for Rangoon forfurther negotiations and to contact the German Embassy. Beforethat, he got the assurance from the German Ministry of Economicsthat Hermes would approve the project if a first installment of10%, 15% on delivery, and the remaining amount in 6 half-yearinstallments (3 years) could be negotiated.

Letter from the German Embassy in Rangoon to the German ForeignMinistry, 14 August 1958

On 11 August, Dr. Maier signed a contract with the (Burmese) WarOffice to establish a munitions factory. The 20 million kyat dealwas made without the involvement of the Hermes-Insurance. Thepayment for the German machines would be made step by step withina period of 27 months. Mr. Maier had promised to inform theMinistry of Economics about the contract. The War Office insistedon the secrecy of the project. According to Fritz Werner, theGerman company Zueblin AG had a good chance to get the contract toconstruct the factory buildings.

*(All correspondence translated from German and summerized)

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